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In April 2016, participants in the “Nonviolence and Just Peace Conference” called on the Catholic 
Church to place greater emphasis on nonviolent peacemaking and to no longer recognize the 
possibility of a just war.1 In the exchanges that have followed, one line of objection has been to 
endorse the first goal but reject the second as dangerously unrealistic. 
While supporting more work to promote nonviolent conflict resolution, Mark Allman and 
Tobias Winright point to cases of military aggression, ethnic cleansing, and genocide where “real-
life challenges” mean nonviolent methods might not be effective enough, leaving armed force as 
the only way to save innocent lives. For them, “Even if the case for just war is rare, such cases still 
occur.”2 
Similarly, Peter Steinfels surveys the world’s war-torn regions and concludes that while “such 
brutal realities” call out for as much “nonviolent peacemaking” as possible, “did the conference 
really imagine that nonviolence alone would stop all this bleeding?”3 
And in his contribution to the special issue of Expositions dedicated to the future of just war 
thinking following the April 2016 conference, Robert Latiff is sympathetic to its call for greater 
peacemaking efforts, but he argues that “officially abandoning just war teaching would be a terrible 
outcome for the Catholic Church.” On his account, such a move, while “well-intentioned,” ignores 
how military force is sometimes “necessary to protect people who need protection” and is therefore 
“extraordinarily naïve and potentially dangerous.” It is “wishful thinking” to reject the need for 
“options to use force” if nonviolent alternatives prove ineffective.4 
This is an important objection. Many people sympathetic to the increasing emphasis on 
nonviolent peacemaking in Catholic teaching on war and peace are nonetheless reluctant to 
completely close the door to the possibility of a just war. They believe that since nonviolent 
alternatives may not always work, sometimes armed force is still necessary to uphold justice and 
protect innocent people from aggression, tyranny, or mass violence such as genocide or ethnic 
cleansing. In such situations, countries or threatened groups are still morally permitted to take up 
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arms to defend themselves. And, if they are too weak to do so, members of the international 
community are still morally permitted to do so on their behalf under the traditional principle of 
humanitarian intervention or, more recently, the international legal norm of a “Responsibility to 
Protect.”5 
I believe that ethical and theological reflection on the incompatibility of war with Catholic 
moral principles and their Gospel foundations should ultimately carry the most weight in the case 
for the Catholic Church to, as the conference participants urge, “no longer use or teach ‘just war 
theory.’”6 I also recognize, however, that for many an important obstacle to supporting such a step 
is the sense that it is unrealistic to completely rule out justified war when sometimes it may be the 
only effective tool available. This concern deserves a response.  
 
Effective at What? 
Peace results from that order structured into human society by its divine Founder, 
and actualized by men as they thirst after ever greater justice.  
 –Gaudium et spes7 
 
True peace therefore is the fruit of justice, that moral virtue and legal guarantee 
which ensures full respect for rights and responsibilities, and the just distribution 
of benefits and burdens. 
 –Pope John Paul II8 
 
This is largely a disagreement about means rather than ends. The authors of the “Nonviolence and 
Just Peace Conference” statement identify themselves as “Christians committed to a more just and 
peaceful world.” Believing that “peace requires justice,” they challenge “militarism,” “economic 
injustice,” “dehumanization,” and “persecution, oppression, exploitation, and discrimination,” 
offering instead a gospel-inspired vision of a nonviolent social order marked by “human dignity 
and thriving relationships.”9 
Such an order is also the basis for arguments to keep some room for justified warfare in the 
Catholic tradition. Kenneth Himes, for example, grounds his case for the moral permissibility of 
some humanitarian interventions in a vision of a “political order” that provides “just laws,” protects 
“public safety,” cares “for the poor and infirm,” and upholds “each person’s basic rights.” On his 
account, sometimes protecting the kind of just order that upholds human dignity in these ways 
requires the “armed force” necessary to “depose tyrants, stop genocide, or deter aggression.”10 
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This, then, is the key question: What is the most effective way to build and maintain this 
common goal of a just and peaceful order—one that upholds human dignity and basic rights, 
promotes human flourishing, and protects persons from aggression, tyranny, and mass violence?  
 
War Is Actually Not Very Effective 
Recourse to violence, in fact, aggravates existing tensions and creates new ones. 
Nothing is resolved by war; on the contrary, everything is placed in jeopardy by 
war. The results of this scourge are the suffering and death of innumerable 
individuals, the disintegration of human relations and the irreparable loss of an 
immense artistic and environmental patrimony. War worsens the sufferings of the 
poor; indeed, it creates new poor by destroying means of subsistence, homes, and 
property, and by eating away at the very fabric of the social environment. […] 
 
Recent history clearly shows the failure of recourse to violence as a means for 
resolving political and social problems. War destroys, it does not build up; it 
weakens the moral foundations of society and creates further divisions and long-
lasting tensions. And yet the news continues to speak of wars and armed conflicts, 
and of their countless victims. How often have my Predecessors and I myself called 
for an end to these horrors! I shall continue to do so until it is understood that war 
is the failure of all true humanism. 
 –Pope John Paul II (italics in original)11 
 
One hallmark of war’s history is the tendency to overestimate its effectiveness, which is why 
leaders, especially of large military powers, routinely get mired in disastrous wars that fail to 
achieve their original aims. This historical trend is also true of domestic armed resistance and 
external interventions over the last century, both of which have proven far more likely to fail than 
succeed, usually just extending violent conflicts and making the emergence of an oppressive 
regime at its conclusion more rather than less likely.12 
This shouldn’t be surprising, since, given its nature, war is a poor candidate to sustain a just and 
peaceful order. War’s original meaning is discord, and Erasmus characterized it as a state of 
disorder where “the laws are compelled to silence, charity is laughed at, justice has no dwelling 
place.”13 As Hugo Slim catalogues in excruciating detail, war zones create spikes in poverty, 
famine, disease, looting, extortion, assault, corruption, and the suppression of human rights. They 
tear families apart and produce streams of refugees vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. For 
people in war zones, fear, humiliation, and hopelessness are constant companions.14 Rape is so 
common that St. Augustine called it a “customary evil” of war.15 As Eileen Egan points out, a good 
definition of war is the corporal works of mercy in reverse.16 
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Wars, even ones conducted by professional militaries with clear rules of engagement, kill 
shocking numbers of civilians, primarily because of the lethality of the weapons involved, the low 
threshold for using them, and uncertainty about the status of targets, what Dave Grossman, in his 
study of lethal violence in war, calls “gray-area killings.”17 War’s levels of killing, whether of 
combatants or noncombatants, relies on systematic dehumanization of its targets to justifying their 
slaughter, as well as the dehumanization involved in training soldiers to suppress mercy and their 
resistance to killing in order to do their job.18 And, of course, for soldiers and civilians who do 
survive war, the legacy is often a lifetime of physical and emotional wounds.  
War, then, is the opposite of an order marked by human dignity, security, and flourishing. It is 
itself a disorder of mass violence, suffering, dehumanization, and injustice. This is why while it is 
rare for a war to successfully stop instances of genocide or ethnic cleansing; genocides and ethnic 
cleansings themselves almost always occur only when wars are already underway, creating an 
environment of mass violence that allows them to emerge.19 It is also why even when war appears 
effective in the short-term, its long-term impact is to usually unleash continuing cycles of more 
armed conflict. Warfare, in the words of John Paul II, “leaves behind a trail of resentment and 
hatred, thus making it all the more difficult to find a just solution of the very problems which 
provoked the war.”20 For example, the culture of violence and resentment caused by World War I 
led directly to World War II, which, in turn, largely produced the Cold War and its many proxy 
wars around the world. To follow just one of these proxy wars, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
was met by American-backed Mujahideen fighters, fueling a civil war that saw the rise of the 
Taliban and Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, leading in turn to the attacks of September 11, 2001 
and subsequent U.S. wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere across the Middle East, which 
themselves have spun-off new civil wars. Other regions and historical periods reveal similar 
patterns of armed conflict, where even the seemingly successful resolution of one war only sows 
the seeds for ones to follow. Indeed, the vast majority of contemporary wars are actually 
continuations of previous ones, civil wars in which their participants are caught in cycles of chronic 
stop-and-start armed conflict.21 Interventions by outside forces are more likely to exacerbate these 
conflicts rather than end them, as illustrated by the 2011 NATO military intervention in Libya, the 
first authorized by the U.N. under the Responsibility to Protect principle, which seemed a short-
term success when it toppled the dictator Muammar Gaddafi, but only fueled ongoing cycles of 
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armed conflict that have continued to devastate the country since. Again and again, war proves 
itself an especially unfit tool to fashion an enduring just and peaceful order.22  
 
Nonviolent Alternatives Are Surprisingly Effective  
In the most local and ordinary situations and in the international order, may 
nonviolence become the hallmark of our decisions, our relationships and our 
actions, and indeed of political life in all its forms. 
 –Pope Francis23 
  
In this way, the solidarity which we propose is the path to peace and at the same 
time to development. For world peace is inconceivable unless the world's leaders 
come to recognize that interdependence in itself demands the abandonment of the 
politics of blocs, the sacrifice of all forms of economic, military or political 
imperialism, and the transformation of mutual distrust into collaboration. This is 
precisely the act proper to solidarity among individuals and nations. 
 –Pope John Paul II24 
 
Fortunately, there are better options. A range of nonviolent tools have a much better track record 
at creating, protecting, and sustaining a just and peaceful order. They can do so in two ways. First, 
they can defend vulnerable persons against aggression, tyranny, and mass violence better than 
armed force. Second, they can reduce the instance of war itself, since, after all, it is in warzones, 
especially those areas of the world with endemic warfare, that human dignity, rights, and 
flourishing are so threatened and that aggression, tyranny, and mass violence are so common. If 
fighting wars is not an especially effective way to uphold a just and peaceful order, fighting war 
actually is.  
One of the most significant political developments of the last century is the emergence of 
nonviolent civil resistance movements as a way to challenge and defeat domestic dictators and 
foreign occupiers. All regimes, even brutal ones, depend on widespread cooperation to function. 
Police and army personnel, government bureaucrats, financial institutions, workers, and everyday 
citizens on the streets all must to do what they are told and contribute to the regime’s ongoing 
operation. This is the vulnerability nonviolent civil resistance exploits. It withdraws the active 
cooperation any regime, whether domestic or occupying, needs to exercise power. When such 
noncooperation becomes organized and widespread enough, the regime’s power collapses as its 
leaders issue orders nobody carries out. From Africa (Tunisia) to Asia (Philippines) to Europe 
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(Serbia) to the Americas (Chile), nonviolent civil resistance has proven itself a powerfully 
effective force.25  
The effectiveness of nonviolent alternatives to armed force by people under threat is supported 
by empirical research. Oliver Kaplan details the techniques vulnerable civilians in war zones use 
to successfully protect themselves from armed groups.26 Adrian Katatnycky and Peter Ackerman’s 
study of how dictatorships end concludes that compared to armed rebellion, nonviolent methods 
are far more successful in removing tyrants and establishing lasting democracy.27 And, in their 
landmark study, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan analyze over 300 cases going back to 1900 
of either armed struggle or nonviolent civil resistance to domestic dictatorships or foreign 
occupation. They find that nonviolent campaigns are nearly twice as effective as violent ones, that 
this success does not depend on how brutal a regime’s response is, and that even among the 
increasingly small percentage of armed struggles that do succeed, they are far more likely to slip 
back into dictatorship and civil war in their aftermath.28 Summarizing other findings since their 
study came out in 2011, they report that regimes are less likely to deploy mass violence against 
civilians when facing nonviolent versus violent movements challenging their rule; that even when 
regimes do react with mass violence, the likelihood of a nonviolent resistant movement’s success 
does not go down; that when a largely nonviolent campaign adds a violent “edge” or “flank” in a 
mixed approach, its effectiveness drops; and that while the success rate for nonviolent movements 
has dipped somewhat in the last few years as more and more groups, including some underprepared 
ones, undertake them and regime leaders adjust their responses, the success rate for violent ones 
has dropped even more, meaning that now nonviolent civil resistance is three times as likely to 
succeed as armed struggle.29 
Just as there are effective nonviolent tools for oppressed peoples to deploy themselves, the 
international community has a range of alternatives to warfare when acting to deter aggression, 
prevent mass violence against vulnerable groups, and reduce the frequency of war itself. These 
tools exist as part of an infrastructure of global governance that Catholic teaching has long 
supported.30 Contrary to conventional wisdom, international relations are not a struggle of all 
against all with armed force the only thing countries ultimately respect. While countries do often 
pursue their own interests, political scientists have demonstrated that international institutions and 
norms strongly shape the behavior of individual countries, including how they understand their 
interests and the options available for pursuing them.31 This is what allows countries to cooperate 
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in regulating a range of issues that cross borders, such as mail delivery, criminal extraditions, free 
trade, or endangered species, and to reform or abolish practices once considered only internal 
matters, such as capital punishment.32 It can also help shift behavior when it comes to armed force. 
For every country that has acquired nuclear weapons in the last half century, another has given 
them up.33 Countries no longer consider war an option for collecting international debts, even 
though it was once a routine justification for going to war.34 And, as the European Union shows, 
closer institutional integration certainly does not eliminate conflicts among countries, but it can 
remove warfare as a plausible way to address such conflicts, even among countries that were once 
chronically at war with each other.35 Indeed, just belonging to intergovernmental organizations, 
even seemingly minor ones such as those regulating fisheries, reduces a country’s risk of engaging 
in war.36  
In this international system, countries have a range of methods to shape each other’s behavior 
and prevent armed conflicts. For shaping behavior, a mix of incentives (integration into regional 
bodies, beneficial trade agreements, debt relief, economic aid, and technology transfers) and 
sanctions, especially those targeting regime leaders and their financial backers (blocking financial 
transactions, asset freezes, travel bans, import/export embargoes, and expulsion from regional 
bodies) can be effective in reducing external aggression and increasing internal democracy and 
respect for human rights, especially if these efforts are multilateral, have clear goals, and are used 
as part of negotiations rather than campaigns for regime change.37 When it comes to preventing 
countries from launching attacks on each other, diplomatic exchanges can successfully construct 
cycles of reciprocal restraint that help adversaries establish lasting peace, and a rising trend toward 
mediation and arbitration efforts, whether by intergovernmental bodies, such as the U.N.’s 
International Court of Justice, or nongovernmental actors, such as the Sant’Egidio community, are 
increasingly effective.38 
Since the majority of wars today are chronic civil wars that go through cycles of stopping and 
restarting, the best way to reduce warfare, and the military aggression and mass violence that it 
unleashes, is to help break this bloody cycle. Fortunately, there are effective tools the international 
community can use to help negotiate a war’s end and prevent it from resuming, tools that, 
compared to military interventions, have a much better success rate at helping a more just and 
peaceful order emerge and endure.39 
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Using a mix of incentives and sanctions, it is possible to push parties in a conflict toward a 
ceasefire and eventually a negotiated settlement with the help of a trusted moderator. This is 
important, since wars that end with a formal negotiated settlement have a better chance of 
producing a lasting peace.40 With the end of active combat, the quick presence of third-party 
monitors of the peace agreement’s implementation can quickly help local leaders and civil society 
groups implement steps that studies show significantly reduce the risk of war breaking out again, 
such as resettling refugees or transitional justice mechanisms.41 Crucially, the greater the 
involvement of women in each of these steps, the greater their likelihood of success.42  
In addition to these shorter-term interventions, the data show the potential of a longer-term 
commitment by the international community to work for the kind of economic and political 
development Catholic teaching has long supported.43 Poor countries are at a much higher risk of 
war, so development assistance that helps address poverty, education, health outcomes, and 
infrastructure can not only improve human flourishing in general, but significantly reduce the odds 
of armed conflict as well.44 Similarly, political institutions that are inclusive, accountable, and 
responsive; that protect the rule of law; that guarantee and civil and political rights, especially for 
women; and that make space for a vibrant and pluralist civil society are not only more consistent 
with human dignity, but also significantly lower the risk of war.45 Importantly, trying to impose 
such political institutions by armed force is much less effective than the slower process of 
promoting democratic reform through diplomatic pressure, incentives and sanctions, and support 
for local activists and civil society groups.46 
The evidence, then, is clear. If the goal is a just and peaceful order, one that upholds human 
dignity and basic rights, promotes human flourishing, and protects persons from aggression, 
tyranny, and mass violence, including the mass violence of war itself, then nonviolent alternatives 
are more effective than warfare.47  
 
The Realism of Repudiation and Abolition  
Never again war, never again war!  
 –Pope Paul VI48 
 
War should belong to the tragic past, to history, it should find no place on 
humanity’s agenda for the future. 
 –Pope John Paul II49  
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Unfortunately, war’s nonviolent alternatives are not guaranteed to succeed. Sometimes they do 
fail, at least in the short term, to stop aggression, tyranny, or mass violence. And sometimes armed 
force has stopped these things, at least in the short term. For some people, the fact that we can 
point to apparent cases of nonviolent failure (e.g., Tiananmen Square) or military success (e.g., 
Kosovo) means that we should not put our faith in nonviolent alternatives to war. But, of course, 
it is a rigged comparison to demand perfect success from nonviolence while overlooking war’s 
own poor success rate. When assessing each, it is important to hold them to the same standards of 
overall effectiveness, and when we do so, we have just seen how nonviolence comes out ahead.  
A related mistake is to argue that because nonviolent alternatives do not always work, people 
might suffer and die unless they resort to war or others do so on their behalf. It is true that 
nonviolent alternatives to war cannot guarantee nobody will suffer or die. This will often be the 
case even when they succeed. But, obviously, war cannot make that guarantee either. Even 
effective wars see plenty of suffering and death, and since most wars fail, this suffering and death 
is usually in vain. The sad truth is that suffering and death are common when resisting violent 
attack or injustice no matter the means of resistance. The happy truth is that nonviolent means do 
usually lower the overall levels of suffering and death, while also giving resisters better odds of 
success. 
Those who criticize calls for Catholics to “no longer use or teach just war theory” might 
acknowledge all of this. They might stipulate that a fair comparison shows that war is more likely 
to produce greater suffering and death and end in failure compared to its nonviolent alternatives, 
which is why nonviolence should be the default position and Church teaching should emphasize it 
more. If a physician treating an ill patient knows of drugs that are more effective and have fewer 
side effects, of course she should start with them rather than going right to a drug that is more 
dangerous and less effective. But sometimes patients don’t respond to the usual treatments, and in 
such cases physicians may try a treatment that is normally more dangerous and less likely to 
succeed because it may seem the only thing left with any chance of working at all. In the same 
way, while war is usually a more destructive and less effective option, maybe we should 
nonetheless hold it in reserve for those extraordinary cases where it may be the only option. 
Nonviolent alternatives may be more effective than war, but why not have both in humanity’s 
toolkit just in case? 
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The most important reason is that by keeping war on the table, the Church signals that it is a 
legitimate option, which has two harmful effects. The first is to feed the myth of war’s 
righteousness and effectiveness, one that often leads humanity to put too much faith in war while 
systematically overlooking its more effective nonviolent alternatives. Sometimes leaving a 
dangerous and less effective drug on the market, especially if it is one that has long been in wide 
use and thought the only effective treatment for a range of illnesses, can lead physicians to 
overprescribe it and patients to overuse it, causing more harm than good and crowding out safer 
and more effective alternatives. The second is that keeping war open as a legitimate option requires 
building militaries to be ready when the need arises. This means diverting wealth from pressing 
social needs such as education or healthcare, directing scientific knowledge and industrial capacity 
toward armaments, and, most significantly, recruiting people, especially the young, for training in 
how to kill. All of this gives violence a place of privilege in our culture, obscuring the damage that 
it does and normalizing war. As the old saying goes, if you put so much effort into building a 
hammer, every problem starts to look like a nail.  
If war is actually ineffective in building, protecting, and sustaining a just and peaceful order, 
and is in fact a primary threat to such an order, then it is a mistake for Catholic teaching to continue 
to legitimize it by carving out room for its moral use. The better, more effective, and, yes, more 
realistic path is to commit to fully delegitimizing war itself as part of the Church’s stated goal of 
eliminating it from the earth.  
If one important strand in Catholic teaching on war and peace over the last century is its growing 
emphasis on nonviolent peacemaking, another related one is its shift away from seeing war as an 
inevitable part of international behavior, where the main moral question is whether or not particular 
armed conflicts meet just war criteria, to developing a powerful moral critique of war itself, leading 
the Church to emerge as an important voice in calls for its abolition.50 The reason delegitimizing 
war as a path toward its abolition is a more realistic way to work for a just and peaceful order is 
that we have seen the process before. The ways humanity abolished other forms of institutional 
violence such as chattel slavery, dueling, or trials by ordeal and combat were complex, but a key 
part of each was a collapse in the institution’s legitimacy following a campaign of consistent and 
total repudiation by abolitionist voices. These voices focused on the wrongness of the institution 
itself, on its being unwarranted for any reason whatsoever, rather than its misuse in particular 
cases. It was the spread of these views that allowed a tipping point towards abolition to emerge 
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and the institution to become socially untenable. Moral repudiation drove the social 
delegitimization that led to abolition.51  
Of course, abolishing war seems daunting, but so did abolishing chattel slavery, dueling, and 
trials by ordeal and combat in their day. And most people don’t realize the progress humanity has 
already made. News accounts of wars around the world obscure the longer-term trends in the 
decline of armed conflict. While the measurements are complex and the data has short-term 
fluctuations, the overall trend in the last few centuries is toward fewer wars and fewer people per 
capita dying in them. Thanks primarily to the spread of anti-war norms and the effective use of the 
alternatives to war we saw above, progress in the last seventy-five years has been particularly 
dramatic, with interstate wars to capture new territory or colonies and redraw national boundaries 
becoming extraordinarily rare by historical comparison. Much of the world is already essentially 
war-free, areas where there is still plenty of injustice and where countries still may have plenty of 
disputes, but where turning to war to address these things is simply not a conceivable option. There 
is still much to do to extend the elimination of war to the remaining areas of the globe where it is 
still present, but the evidence shows that it is certainly a realistic possibility.52 
A truly realist understanding of war recognizes that the most effective way to secure a just and 
peaceful order is to abolish war itself in favor of its nonviolent alternatives, and that such abolition 
requires consistent and straightforward repudiations of war that deny it any legitimacy. This is a 
role Catholic teaching can, should, and is well-suited to fill. There is even a recent and familiar 
template for doing so. For most of human history, capital punishment was accepted around the 
globe as a widespread, routine, and legitimate punishment for a wide array of ordinary crimes. 
Doing without it seemed unrealistic and naively dangerous. Yet, in just the last century, it has been 
abolished in almost every country on earth and restricted to a rare number of cases in the handful 
of countries that still use it.53 This is a remarkable historical shift in worldwide criminal justice 
practice, and Catholicism has played an important role in making it happen. By turning against 
capital punishment—by gradually shrinking any permissible use to zero while shifting its focus to 
repudiating the institution itself as immoral and ineffective—the Church helped delegitimize its 
use and pave the way for its widespread, though still incomplete, abolition. The same formula is 
possible for war. Repudiation is the realistic path to abolition, and it is one Catholic teaching is 
ready to walk. 
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